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Stay-aways and the Black Working Class since the Second World
War - the evaluation of a strategy. E.C. Webster
"one fine morning all the workers in every industry in a
country or perhaps in every country, will cease work and thereby
in at most four weeks will compel the propertied classes, either
to submit or to launch an attack on the workers, so that the
latter will have the right to defend themselves and may use the
opportunity to overthrow the entire old society". Engels.
There is a widespread belief, among some who hope for change in
South Africa, that if only all Blacks withdrew their labour, the
whole structure of South Africa would collapse. It is a subject
which has received little academic attention. It is my intention
in this paper to examine this notion in three parts.. In Part I a
brief history of stay-aways between 1950 and 1961 will be given.
In Part II its reemergence in Soweto will be examined. In Part III
the limitations of the stay-away as a tactic of working-class action
will be discussed and contrasted with the more wide-spread plant-
based action of the 1970s. (This is not meant to imply that
limitations do not exist in plant-based action.) The Namibian
general strike of 1971-2 is excluded from this analysis as its
relative degree of "success" demonstrates the uniqueness of that
situation - viz. the existence of a reasonably self-sufficient
rural base to which striking workers could withdraw. Yet even in
Namibia workers could ultimately, says Moorsom, not escape the
major contradiction in their strategy "that although access to
peasant resources considerably expanded their power to prolong
resistance, they could no longer, as a matter of inescapable
necessity, opt out of wage-labour indefinitely - the platform of
the strike committee embodied a tacit acknowledgement of the
3
irrevocable necessity of wage-labour."
Part I : Stay-at-homes 1950 - 1961
The stay-at-home emerged as a specific tactic of black resistance
in South Africa when in December 1949 the African National Congress
(ANC) adopted the Programme of Action aimed at non-collaboration,
a disobedience campaign and a general withdrawal of labour. (Table 1)
The Programme of Action had been presented first to ANC Annual
Conference of 1948 but had been referred back to the National
Executive and Provincial Councils. A.B. Xuma, president at the time,
revealed his basic sympathy for the principle underlying the stay-
away when he spoke in his presidential address of the way South Africa
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relied on the African workers "the backbone of the economy and
4
industrial structure of South Africa - invincible atomic bomb".
The acceptance of the Programme of Action by the ANC marks a change
in the strategy of the ANC, signalled by the establisment of the
ANC youth league in 1943 and growing cooperation between CNETU,
ANC, CP and the Indian Congresses.
The stay-away was first used on 1st May 1950 as a day of protest
to mark the general dissatisfaction of the African people with their
position in the country. A similar stay-away was held on 26th June
1950. The Guardian reports that the Rands Industries came to a
standstill when at least 80 percent of the African, Indian and
Coloured workers remained at home and observed May Day as Freedom
Day. They recorded that 500 Blacks had been dismissed for not coming
to work. Street parades were held on May Day in Cape Town, Durban,
Bethal and Bloemfontein. A second stay-at-home was called for by
the ANC for the 26th of June as a national day of protest and
mourning. Selby Msimang, Provincial Secretary of the ANC, is
reported to have said to workers that "you can tell your employers
that the day of protest is not directed against them, but that it
is a protest against the propsed laws of the country". Essentially
it was a protest against the Suppression of Communism Bill, the
Group Areas Bill and what was described as "all discriminatory laws
in South Africa". The National Day of Protest Co-ordinating
Committee claimed that in Port Elizabeth, Durban and most of the
Natal areas a complete stoppage occurred. In Johannesburg and the
Reef towns the majority of black people stayed at home. Transport
from the townships came in empty, only a handful of black dockworkers
reported for duty and about three quarters of the black railway
staff stayed away from work. Thousands of Africans and Indians
stayed away in Natal - 60 percent in Durban stayed away, bringing
the textile, tobacco and furniture industries to a complete
standstill. At least 30 printing, clothing and laundry establishments
were closed for the day, while in 40 other establishments there was
an acute shortage of labour.
Although a third stay-away was held in the Cape Peninsula on 7th
May 1951, that year saw a change in tactics from stay-aways to
Passive Resistance. The Joint Planning Council at its November
meeting, put forward the defiance campaign and industrial action
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as the two choices before Congress. As between these alternatives,
the planners recognised "that industrial action is second to none,
the best and most important weapon in the struggle of the people
for the repeal of unjust laws, and that it is inevitable that this
method of struggle has to be undertaken at one time or another
g
during the course of the struggle". Nevertheless, they opposed,
though they did not positively exclude, industrial action in the
initial phase of the struggle. Leo Kuper gives three reasons for
this decision. Firstly, he argues, that the Council's terms of
reference did not specify economic change and besides the two
Congresses did not have an agreed economic policy. Secondly, the
Council, apart from J.B. Marks, Yusef Daidoo, Ahmed Cachali and
Walter Sisulu, did not picture the struggle as one of class. They
emphasised, instead, colour as the basis of their subordination.
A third factor was the weakness of the African trade union movement
at this time. It has also been argued that "the class composition
fo the leadership had tended to prefer methods of moderation at
every stage in the liberatory struggle, reflecting the mood of
11
most conservative elements of the middle class".
For five years the stay-away was not used by the Congress movement
as a tactic of resistance. During these intervening years two
events were crucial in the developing strategy of Congress; the
first was the launching of SACTU in 1955 as the trade union wing
of Congress, the second was the signing of the Freedom Charter.
However, 1957 opened with the popular and successful bus boycotts
in Alexandria, Sophiatown, Lady Selbourne and Mooiplaas. Responding
to this new mood of militancy SACTU launched a campaign for higher
wages, calling for a pound a day with the slogan Asinamali. This
was followed by a successful stay-away on 26th June estimated to
1 2have been 80 percent effective on the Reef. Colonel J.J. Kruger
acting Deputy Police Commissioner for the Witwatersrand, appealed
to employers to "take a firm stand with native employees who did
not arrive at work". L. Lulofs, President of the Chamber of
Industries, stated that the pound a day was "reckless and completely
irresponsible". A private circular to employers was distributed
telling them to warn their African employees that "absence on June
26th would be a breach of contract. Illegal abstention would be
dealt with by way of summary dismissals. Banishment from urban
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areas will follow". The circular continued "leniancy and indulgence
at this juncture would be followed by dire consequences. The
demonstration fixed for Wednesday must be faced by industry with
resolute solidarity and a refusal of our labour force to be
employed as political puppets".
At least one employer, the Johannesburg City Council, took these
warnings seriously, and after a 75 percent stay-away among African
building workers, dismissed a number of members of the African
Building Workers Industrial Union (founded in 1957 and affiliated
to SACTU). In a circular to all Africans in the housing division
A.J. Archibald, Director of Housing, said "in future strikes all
employees participating would be automatically suspended. African
foremen and clerks "absent during strikes" would be considered
"unfit as leaders" and automatically discharged or demoted".
Others might also be discharged and will not readily be employed
in a similar capacity elsewhere. Learners would have their
learnership cancelled. All men in conditional employment will
automatically be sent back to their homes, and those occupying
1 4
municipal houses may be deprived of them". In addition 1957 saw
a rapid increase in Wage Board activity. The government recommended
the re-investigation of the position of general unskilled workers,
on the Rand, in Cape Town, Durban, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, East
London, Port Elizabeth and Kimberley, who fell under Determination
105, which had not been revised since 6th November 1951. Minimum
wages payable to them were £1.7 a week. New determinations were
to be drafted for the laundry, cleaning and dyeing trade in all
principal towns; the bread and confectionery industry on the
Witwatersrand and Pietermaritzburg, stevedoring in the four main
ports; the clothing industry in the Transvaal and uncontrolled areas
and for the meat trade in the principal centres. These determinations
i 5
revised the trend of declining real wages after 1958.
However, in spite of the effectiveness of the stay-away on the
Reef, their seems little sign of any organised attempt to call a
strike. There was no picketing apart from some stickers saying
"stay home June 26th", which appeared in some areas. The slogan
Awisphatiwe (we don't touch work) seems to have sprung up
1 ft
spontaneously from the workers themselves.
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In contrast with the relatively spontaneous and successful stay-
away of 1957, the 1958 stay-away involved more planning but was a
clear failure. At the end of 1957 SACTU launched a new organised
campaign under the slogan of a pound a day. At their December
conference there was a talk of a general strike to achieve this
demand. A mass national conference of workers was called for in
Johannesburg in March 1958 to start a general campaign for this
minimum wage demand. However, what started out as a trade union
matter was soon extended to become a United Congress campaign with
new slogans. Luthuli, President of the ANC at the time, clarified
the all-class nature of the congress alliance when he emphasised
that although the campaign was headed by demands for a national
minimum wage, it included an "all round increase in wages for all
workers; the abolition of the pass laws, security of employment;
end to job reservation; rent increases and Group Areas; and the
right to vote and be elected to the government of the country".
In addition, Luthuli stressed that this conference must avoid
two errors. "Firstly the error of assuming that a "Workers
Conference" is the same thing as a trade union conference. It is
not, especially in this country where the overwhelming majority of
workers aren't organised into unions. Secondly, the error of
forgetting that Congress is not exclusively a workers organisation;
it has in its ranks businessmen, professionals, housewives, etc."
He concluded by saying "let us take care not to concentrate only
on the factories and ignore the townships, where we are strong.
Workers, after all, live in the townships, so we must secure
delegates from these townships elected by working people at
1 fl
township meetings".
It was decided at the National Workers Conference to stage a
national stay-at-home during the coming General Election (April).
In the words of one of the delegates "if we cannot vote on a ballot
paper we shall find another way to vote". A resolution to participate
in the pound a day campaign was among the resolutions passed.
Support was, however, far from solid. Feit alleges that many of the
younger ANC members mutinied at the thought of non-African control
of the ANC that seemed implied by participation in the campaign,
and against a new campaign in the name of "Workers". This manifested
itself in violent demonstration, leaving the ANC sorely divided
1 9
against itself. Officials of five African trade unions on the
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Rand - the GWU (African womens branch), African Bakers1 and
Confectioners1 Union, the African Motor Workers Union, the African
Tobacco Workers Union (separate sections for men and women) - gave
their support to the Africanist refusal to participate in the stay-
at-home. "We as responsible trade union leaders do not believe
that the proposed decision will help native workers, many of whom
are living below the breadline, to win better wages. Rather we
believe it will harm our cause. Consequently we ask employers to
cooperate to ensure, as much as possible, the safety of their
20
workers". Possibly a more plausible explanation was the nature
of Congress itself. The leadership of Congress, it was argued,
transformed an essentially working-class campaign into a broad
political front and placed at the fore a different slogan ("the
21Nats must go") which related to the coming election. The underlying
assumptions of this parliamentary strategy were made explicit by
Harmel when he put forward the C.P. two-stage revolutionary strategy
arguing that the process of economic growth in South Africa will
break down the irrationality of apartheid leading to a democratic
revolution. He said that "the type of despotism we still endure in
the Union in this age...is a kind of freak, an anachronism which
cannot hope much longer to survive". It was on this basis that the
Congress Alliance was persuaded to direct their attention to the
22
white electorate.
The three day stay-away planned for April 14th - 16th fizzled out
into an almost complete fiasco and the organisers, as a consequence,
officially called it off after the first day. On the Witwatersrand
less than 10 percent stayed away, although Indian stores were
closed. Port Elizabeth, an old ANC stronghold, had a 50 percent
stay-away to begin with but it tailed off during the day. In Durban
30 percent stayed away. However, as the Transvaal Chamber of
Industries noted in a privately circulated memo, "in isolated and
sporadic instances some organisations were very seriously affected
and that absenteeism continued even after the protest was officially
23
called off by the organisers". The clearest example of an almost
completely successful stay-away on this occasion was Sophiatown
and Newclare.
Why did this stay-away fail? Firstly, the ANC was divided over the
campaign, leading to confusion among the members. The Reverend
- 7 -
Gawe, for example, a leading ANC figure in the Eastern Cape, issued
a press statement which seemed to suggest that the Workers Conference
had nothing to do with the ANC. In Natal the ANC was completely
divided over the decision and there was no united preparation for
the campaign. Leading Congress officials in many Reef towns openly
broke the call, and the workers were left in confusion. Added to
this division within the leadership a number of leading Africanists
(Madzunya) condemned the protest. Furthermore, within the weeks
preceding the stay-away the English language press and The World
in particular, reduced the effectiveness of the campaign by
publicising extensively opposition to it. The World ran many
stories casting doubt on the possibility that the boycott would
succeed. The Star featured quotations from supposedly important
ANC leaders against the stay-away and the Natal Mercury printed on
its front page the message in Zulu from the Paramount Chief of the
25
Zulus calling on the people not to take part in the stoppage.
Secondly, it seems likely that the campaign would have had a better
response if the slogans had been confined to a pound a day, with
the trade union movement at the centre of the campaign and the
appeal directed mainly to the industrial worker. Workers seemed
unable or unwilling to sacrifice their wages for the three days the
strike was planned to last over a political issue. Needless to say
the Nationalists increased their overall majority in parliament
from 96 to 103. A third factor was the presence of police in all
areas during this three day protest. On the one hand this involved
displays of power by parading Union defence force tanks, calling
out the entire police force and placing the army on standby and
banning meetings. On the other hand, as in Sophiatown, it involved
police intimidation through indiscriminate baton charges, assaults
and a threat of being endorsed out. In Durban stevedores were
forced out of privately-owned compounds by police when they refused
to do any overtime during the three days of the campaign. When, on
the Tuesday, those who did go to work downed tools and refused to
work unless paid one pound a day, the police were called and they
'or!
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were forced to return to work. In Dundee 371 African wo kers were
arrested for having stopped work during the stay-at-home.
Finally, there had been intensive activity amongst the employers 1
organisations on the Witwatersrand since June 26th 1957, encouraging
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them to establish liaison with "responsible native opinion",
pointing out to them the wage increases that had been put into
effect. In a memorandum distributed by the Transvaal Chamber of
Industries after the 1957 stay-away it said "where the liaison
existed the employers were able, on the one hand to explain the
abortive nature of the proposed action of their workers and, on
the other hand, to indicate that emplouers would take a serious
view of any disruption caused by workers who stayed away from
, .. 2 8work .
The New Age, a Congress newspaper, saw the question of organisation
as the key to why the campaign did not succeed. Their answer was
to call for more organisation "it is significant that the stoppage
was most complete wherever organisation was best - in Port Elizabeth
and Sophiatown, in the Reef industries like milling and textiles,
where the militant trade unions are strongest - slogans are not
good enough. The only answer is to build the strength of the people
on sure foundations to organise the workers to give their machinery
29
in which they have confidence" . It was this change in emphasis
that was to lead to the establishment of factory committees which
were to combine both industrial and political functions. Congress
argued the need to combine both functions, -.' because
"wage issues were very often unrealizable in straight trade union
terms. If advanced workers made demands they would be charged.
The only way to take up wage issues was in the context of a national
campaign, campaigning in a big way to create a climate which would
force the government and employers to give concessions". This, says
Lambert, meant factory committees were to be rushed into national
campaigns neglecting plant-based strike action. In fact strikes
were to decline, as Table 2 shows, in 1958* Qoth the change in
strategy and the decline in . wages (see Table 3) may be factors
causing a decline in strikes. Yet Luthuli as president of the ANC
seemed to see the campaign purely in terms of a demonstration.
Consequently he felt that the stay-away succeeded in as much as it
made the demands of the people known to the government, but that the
people did not respond as the organisers had expected them to the
call. "The African people as a whole did not measure up to that
call". 3 1
SACTU responded to the failure of the 1958 campaign by pursuing its
pound a day campaign and a membership drive for 20,000 new members.
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The ANC declared 1959 an anti-pass year. By December there were
again calls from the rank and file for a general strike against
the passes. This demand became pressing and at a Workers
Conference in early 1960 there was talk from the delegates of a
32
national stay-at-home. The focus on pass laws was no doubt in
part a result of the tightening up of their administration over
this period in the face of growing structural unemployment estimated
33
at 1.2 million in 1960.
However, meanwhile the rival organisation Pan Africanist Congress,
having split from the ANC in 1958 from a broadly Africanist
perspective, was now competing with the ANC for mass support. On
the 18th March the Pan Africanist Congress announced that an anti-
pass campaign would begin on the 21st March. Members were instructed
to leave their passes at home and present themselves in small groups
for arrest at police stations. Their aim, writes Lodge) was to
bring industry to a standstill and no one was to work until the pass
system was abolished and a minimum wage established. "With the
overcrowding of the prisons and a total strike the government would
have to meet these demands. This would be a first stage in
achieving independence and a non-racial South Africa by 1963. The
leaders were to be in the forefront of those arrested and all were
to reject bail, fines or defence". In fact little organisational
preparations had been undertaken by the PAC. There can be little
doubt, argued the S.B. in their evidence to the Sharpeville inquiry,
that had the labour supply been affectively withheld in the
Vereenging-Van der Byl Park area (steel, power ) that the economy
34
could have been seriously affected. In the meantime, the ANC's
plans had crystallised and a more carefully planned stay-away
campaign was to begin on the 31st March.
The campaign led, as is well-known, to a major confrontation in
Sharpeville and, to a lesser extent Langa. The ANC, having stood
aside on the 21st March, now called for a national day of mourning
on the following Monday, 28th March, and the national stay-at-home
followed. In most large industrial areas the workers stayed at home
and in areas where it occurred there was a 90 percent response. In
Sharpeville and in Langa the stay-at-home lasted for as much as ten
days. The.government seemed, for a moment, to hesitate when passes
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SURVEY OF RESPONSES TO THE STRIKE CALL
REGION
Johannesburg
INDUSTRY/SERVICE
Textile
Laundry
SAMPLE RESPONSE OF
INDIVIDUAL FACTORIES
100% strike out of 250
45 workers out of 50
495 500
495 500
16 17
100% all 3 days. 6/40
drivers attended work.
100% strike out of 300
76 workers out of 80
Food and Canning
Furniture
32T>
100';':
100%
100%
workers
strike
strike
out
out
out
of
of
of
500
80
50
60
Clothing
100% 100
300 workers out of 400
154 160
^ response
GENERAL
First four factories closed for all
3 days. No response at Amato where
Union suffered after the '57 strike
In addition to the 3 surveyed here
9 factories employing 1000 workers
closed down for the period.
No response at LKB Benoni.
In all Provinces, One factor: cloth-
ing industries, hit by border
industries. Many on short time. Many
Manufacturers did not mind closing
down.
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REGION INDUSTRY/SERVICE
Durban Clothing
Textile
Dis tributive
Timber
Sheet metal
Metal
Twine and bag
Milling
Chemical
Sweet
Leather
Match
Municipal
Docks & Railways
Indian traders
Pietermaritzburg Howick rubber
SAMPLE RESPONSE OF GENERAL
INDIVIDUAL FACTORIES
80% lor 3 days
70% - 50% 1st and 2nd days
50% 1st day only
70% - 80%, -30%, -40% 1st and 2nd days
703-80%, -50% 1st and 2nd days
50%-C,0% 1st day only
80/Q 40% 1st and 2nd days
60% 1st day only
50% - 60% 1st day only
100% for 3 days.
60% - 70% Bata shoe Co. closed 3 days
50%
Warnings of dismissal.
Police and army cordoned
off compounds and forced
to work.
Total response on 1st day.
A1J .1500 workers strike.
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focussed broadly around national political issues. The large scale
work stoppages which have occurred in recent times, wrote Clack
in the early '60's, are only incidental strikes, having been political
43demonstrations against general rather than industrial disabilities.
This is not to deny that plant-based strikes took place during this
period; see Table II which provides evidence of strikes during this
period. When plant-based strikes occurred, SACTU often gave direct
support. Two examples will indicate this. In the Consolidated
Textile Mills in Durban in 1957 SACTU and ANC gave vigorous support
to the strikers. In 1958 3,000 African workers went out on strike
in the Amato Textile Mills for higher wages and received support
44
from SACTU and the ANC. Yet, while SACTU gave support to plant-
based action, such action was clearly secondary, as a strategy to
the stay-aways. What underpinned the stay-away as a tactic is a
theoretical assumption that a tight interrelationship exists between
economics and politics. SACTU1s assumption was that "the organising
of this great mass of African workers was linked inextricably with
their struggle for political rights and liberation from old
oppressive laws. Every attempt to organise themselves was hampered
by general legislation affecting their right of movement, domicile
and political representation. Every effort for higher wages,
better working conditions or the reinstatement of unjustly dismissed
45fellow workers, was immediately met by the full force of the state".
This led, some have argued, to the subordination of the trade union
struggle to the movement for national liberation, where organisational
energies were continually diverted into politically based stay-
aways. This, we have argued, was what happened in 1958 when the
essentially worker-based slogan of a pound a day was appropriated
and turned into the false slogan of the "Nats must go". While it
is true that after the 1958 failure SACTU went on a major recruiting
campaign aimed at 20,000 new trade union members, members were
signed up into SACTU without being properly organised, so that
support eventually fell away when unions failed to improve material
conditions.
Yet, if, as Bonner suggests, we situate SACTU in its historical
48context, we see SACTU's dilemma more clearly. This was a per.
of recession where the material conditions of Africans were
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deteriorating. Between 1948 and 1958 wages dropped by 5% and again
between 1957 and 1968 by 1%. (See Table 3)
Furthermore, the rate of growth of employment in manufacturing
declined from 5.6% between 1945 and 1950 to 1.6% between 1950 and
491960. Faced by these deteriorating conditions black workers
responded through a ground swell of popular resistance such, as bus
boycotts, and SACTU had to choose either to let this wave of
opposition sweep past them or respond positively by trying to direct
it into a more viable and sustained opposition. Not surprisingly
they chose to try and capture it, but lacking any adequate
organisational base they were forced to use the limited tactic of
the stay-away - a tactic as we have seen, that is most effective
when some form of factory organisation existed.
It is clear that the political leadership during this decade
perceived the stay-away, with the possible exception of the PAC's
quasi s.ynidcalist overtones in 1960, as largely a demonstrative
weapon and lacking adequate organisation at the point of production,
they saw that the weapon had limited value. To dismiss the stay-
aways as ineffective demonstrative acts of protest that constituted
no threat to the structure of power and simply led to a tightening
of the repressive apparatus, is to fail to situate this
strategy in the political economy of the time - a political economy
which, we have argued, was for many blacks deteriorating in material
terms.
Yet to situatethe strategy in the political economy is not to deny
that opportunities were missed, particularly in the organisation
of the urban working class. Had all options of non-violent change
been explored when the ANC took the decision to embark on violence?
I want to argue in the final section that it was not simply that
the decision was premature; it failed to locate the struggle on
the battle ground where workers could establish viable intermediary
institutions .to win the confidence to take on wider struggles.
Part II - The Re-emergence of the Stay-Away - Soweto 1976
The stay-away was only to re-emerge 15 years later, seven weeks
after the June 16th demonstration against Bantu education in.
Soweto, when the newly-formed SSRC organised, as its first action,
TABLE 1 . BLACK STAY-AWAYS IN S . A . SINCE THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5,
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
Date
1 May 1950
26 June 1950
7 May 1951
26 June 1957
14-16 April 1958
21 March 1960
28 March 1960
29-31 May 1961
4-6 Aug.1976
23-25 Aug.1976
13-15 Sept.1976
16-17 Sept.1976
1 - 5 Nov. 1976
16-17 June 1977
Proposed
Duration
1 day
1 day
1 day
1 day
3 days
Indefinitely
1 day
3 days
3 days
3 days
3 days
2 days
5 days
2 days
Area
Witwatersrand
National
W. Cape
National
National
National
National
National
Johannesburg
Johannesburg
Reef
W.Cape
Reef
Reef
Objective
General political
protest Communism'.Act
Racial Communism Act
discrimination
Protest against removal
of 'coloured1 vote
£1 a day
Protest against
General Elections
Pass laws
National Day of Mourning
National Convention
Bantu Education
Detained students
II M
tl II
n it
it ii
Day of protest
over 1976
Organizers
CP, ANC &
Indian Congresses
ANC and
Indian Congresses
Franchise
Action Council
Congress Alliance
Congress Alliance
P.A.C.
Congress Alliance
National Action Council
o.S.R.C.
•p
S.S.R.C.
Effectiveness *
Partial success
Partial success
Partial success
Success
Failure
Partial success
Success
Partial success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Failure
*See Part III of my
paper on the notion
of successful stay-awa}
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a three day stay-away on the 5th, 5th, 6th August 1976.
Announcing the call for a stay-away Masfiinini, president of the
SSRC, said "We had gone as far as we could and now it was important
that we strike at the industrial structure of South Africa".
The SSRC seemed to be firmly in control in the townships; road
blocks prevented Putco buses and taxis from going to town, students
picketed at the thirteen railway stations in Soweto, and the trains
were virtually empty. Under cross examination, at the SSRC trial
at Kempton Park during 1978, a state witness described how they
were told by Mashinini, SSRC president, to stop people going to work,
He said "that bigger school-children should get to railway stations
and talk to the parents not to go to work, persuade them from going
52
to work". Sometimes bus drivers were threatened and city-bound
workers were stoned and forced to turn back. One Putco bus driver
giving evidence at the same trial, gave evidence of how children
stopped the bus (on 4th August) and ordered the passengers inside
the bus to get out saying "You know you have been told not to go to
work as a result the children then picked up stones and stoned
the bus".
Johannesburg's firms reported on an absenteeism rate of 50-60%.
Enterprises were affected in different degrees, one large department
store reporting absenteeism as high as 75%, while manufacturers in
the food, motor accessories, tobacco, rubber, electrical, hotel and
54finance sectors reported figures ranging from 30-50%. The SSRC
claimed 85% effectiveness. Whatever the precise figure, the SSRC
had demonstrated their ability to ensure the withdrawal of labour
in Soweto. To what extent this first stay-away was a popular
demonstration of support for the SSRC is difficult to ascertain.
Without doubt some of the workers were genuinely intimidated.
But it is equally certain that there were many who stayed away in
sympathy with the students' aims. However, workers were confused
as to what they would gain by staying away from work. The SSRC
was demanding the release of detained students and abolition of
Bantu education, but to many workers these demands were remote.
They were taking the risk of losing their jobs for a campaign that
failed to pose specific demands. Furthermore, the SSRC made one
crucial mistake in early August for which Soweto paid dearly -
they ignored the hostel dwellers.
During the second stay-away (23rd, 24th & 25th August) absenteeism
was higher, between 70 and 80%. In some cases in the retail
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distributive trade work attendance was down to 25%. This was in
spite of greater harrassment and fewer road blocks and pickets at
the railway station. At the entrance to Soweto a hugh contingent
of police stood guard and students picketing at the stations were
far out-numbered by riot police in armoured hippos. Part of it
was the result of a concerted attempt (neglected in the first stay-
away) on the part of the students to maintain solidarity with the
workers. During the preceding weekend they had distributed leaflets
calling for a student-worker alliance. However, it was during this
stay-away that the migrant workers went on the rampage leaving 70
people dead. Whether the "Zulu backlash" was a spontaneous outburst
of men wanting to go back to work, or whether it was planned and
foiled by security forces, -1 . is difficult to ascertain. Newspapers
gave numerous accounts of overt police collaboration in the "backlash"
and Buthelezi, after careful examination, concluded that the incident
appeared to have been stage-managed by the police. Police, of
course, denied these allegations, pleading inability to stop the
rampage. The following comment by General Prinsloo summed up their
attitude. "I have no knowledge of these rampaging Zulus, but if it
is happening I am not surprised. If people want to organise
themselves into resisting Tsotsis we can't stop them. The people
are getting very fed up with the things that are happening in
Soweto."57
However, what is clear is that the students failed adequately to
consult and explain to the hostel dwellers why they should stay
away from work. The majority of Soweto hostel dwellers are migrant
workers, only entitled to live in Johannesburg for the 12 month
period they are lawfully contracted to work for a specific employer.
They come from rural areas and regard their time in the hostels as
temporary. They tend to be perceived by township residents as being
culturally and geographically separate from the townships. There
are various derogatory terms coined by the township residents, such
as amoverails, (the overall wearers) , that accentuates their
aloofness from the hostel dwellers and illustrates their general
attitude of disdain. However, the fact that they participated
fully in the September stay-aways does seem to suggest that the
rampage could have been prevented by more careful attention to the
specific priorities and interests of hostel dwellers.
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The third stay-away (13th-.15th September) brought hostel dwellers,
Soweto students and parents together in a joint campaign of up to
5980% effectiveness in Johannesburg. Over the weekend the SSRC
distributed this leaflet. (Exhibit B3 Court Record)
A Z I K H W E L W A I
Parents: Co-operate with us! Workers: Stay away from work!
Hostels: Do not fight!
STAY AT HOME: Monday 13th, Tuesday 14th and Wednesday 15th September,''
NO VIOLENCE! NO BLOODSHED!
SOWETO STUDENTS REPRESENTATIVE COUNCIL
Once again we appeal to Parents and all Workers to co-operate with
us.
We call upon our parents and workers to stay away from work from
Monday 13th to Wednesday 15th September, '76.
This will be a proof that you are crying with us over those cruelly
killed by police and those detained all over the country in various
prisons without trial.
WE STRONGLY OBJECT TO:
1. The shooting of Black people by Jimmy Kruger's police.
2. The arrest and detention of Black people and calling them
agitators.
3. The killing of already three men in detention and calling it
suicide, (in Durban, King Williamstown & Cape Town).
4. One uncalled-for so-called train accident in Benoni - this
reminding us of the Dube and Langlaagte accidents where our
people died painful deaths.
5. The cutting down of our parents1 wages who had stayed away
from work in sympathy with their killed sons and daughters.
UNITY IS STRENGTH!
POWER IS IN OUR HANDS!
In Johannesburg and the Reef areas, the engineering industry stated
that between 25-60 percent of the workers were absent. The
Financial Mail spotcheck of firms revealed a 50 percent absentee
rate in Premier Milling, 50 percent in Advance Laundry, 50-70
percent in the O.K. Bazaars, 60-70 percent in Checkers, 20-50
percent in Edgars Stores and 80 percent at the University of the
Witwatersrand. However, the largest hit was the Johannesburg
Transport Department where 90 percent of the African bus drivers
62
stayed away.
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Using- direct methods reminiscent of the 1958 and 1961 stay-aways,
police' went from house to house in parts of Soweto and Alexandria
asking why people were not at work, and either ordering them to
go to work or arresting them. Initially the police said the
operation was not connected with the stay-away, it was a "crime
64preventitive operation aimed at f lulling out criminals and layabouts".
Later Brigadier Kriel admitted that it was "a clean up operation
aimed at protecting those who wished to work and rounding up
agitators".65
The third stay-away showed signs of spreading beyond Soweto.
Although a call for a three-day stay-at-home in Pretoria was
unsuccessful, about a quarter of Krugersdorp1s workers stayed away.
The day the third stay-away ended on the Reef one began in Cape
Town, (15th & 16th September). At least three leaflets were
circulated in an attempt to disrupt the strike. Two, printed in
English and Xhosa, opposed strikes outright. A third, widely
circulated among passengers at railway stations and bus terminals
read "Workers please note, our big strike for Wednesday and Thursday,
is postponed until next week. We will call on you again". Thousands
of anti-strike leaflets were dropped from a helicopter over the
townships. However, police were able to trace down at least one
pamphlet distributed, (at soccer grounds and mosques in Cape Town) .
and calling for the stay away on the 14th and 15th. In spite of
these disruptive tactics, the strike achieved 80 percent
effectiveness. The clothing industry, with a 49,000 labour force,
lost two full days of production. Only between 10 and 30 percent
of workers showed up on these days. About 150,000 to 200,000 Cape
workers forfeited more than a third of their weekly pay packets to
obey the strike call. Other employers announced the dismissal of
employees who stayed away on Wednesday, but even more workers
stayed away on the Thursday. The two-day stay-away in Cape Town
cost the city more than three million man hours (375,000 man days).
The third stay-away was clearly the most successful of the four stay-
aways called for by the SSRC in 1976 and included the participation
of large numbers of Coloureds in the Cape. Attempts had been made
to consult parents and workers and it spread for the first time
beyond Soweto to a significant extent. In fact in terms of man hours
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lost and the number of employees involved, the September stay-away
would be the largest strike since the Second World War. In
Johannesburg and the Cape Peninusula alone, half a million workers
(300,000 in Johannesburg and 200,000 in the Cape) stayed away.
This is considerably larger than the Department of Labour's figures
for the Durban strikes in 1973 (98,029 employees involved and
229,137 man days lost). Thus we have the curious situation of the
largest "strike" not being recorded in the official statistics
because an industrial dispute is generally accepted by the
Department of Labour to deal with matters affecting the employer/
employee relationship alone. A fourth stay-away, called for
five days (1st - 5th November), was a failure.
While clearly the series of police raids and harrassment during
this period had seriously affected the ability of the SSRC to
organise effectively, and develop a consistent strategy, the failure
of this stay-away brought out, above all, the limitations of both
the SSRC and the tactics they adopted. Essentially the value of the
stay-away lay in its demonstrative power and its limitation was that
one could not go on for too long simply demonstrating without a
clear objective which linked up with the interests of the majority
of those participating. The demands put forward before the fourth
stay-away by the SSRC president, Khotsu Seathole, were too vague
and unrealistic to link up with workers. The press statement released
by Khotsu called upon "Mr John Vorster, Jimmy Kruger and their white
facist., racist, oppressive regime to:
a) Resign en bloc.
b) Release all political detainees
c) Open detente with our black parents
71
d) Stop killing our brothers in the ghetto.
This stay-away was ignored by the vast majority of workers. Workers,
as Kane-Berman describes, were in a dilemma - as parents, and as
blacks, they no doubt felt they should support their children, as
breadwinners they may be prepared on occasion to lose a fair day's
wages but naturally they will be reluctant to jeopardise their jobs,
72particularly at a time when unemployment was running high.
Furthermore, employers made it clear in advance that they would
adopt a tougher attitude than they had during the early stay-aways.
The Transvaal Chamber of Industries had recommended employers take
up a tough attitude of "no work and no pay". Some workers had
already been dismissed because of previous stay-aways- Migrant
workers, in particular, feared deportation to the rural areas if
they broke their contracts by staying away from work. Furthermore,
the fact that the black trade union movement on the Witwatersrand
did not" respond to the stay-aways was also indicative of the gap
74
between the black students and organised black labour.
Part III - The Implications of the Stay-Aways
We have identified and examined fourteen stay-aways between 1950
and 1977. Of course a clear difference exists between the early
and later stay-aways. The latter stay-aways take place in the
context of a structurally transformed economy - of growing capital
intensity and massive foreign investment since 1961 and the
consequent development in the size, strategic location and
consciousness of the black working class. Furthermore, the earlier
stay-aways were organised by the Congress movement on a national
basis and consisted of older and more established leaders. They had,
through SACTU, an organised link with the working class. The 1976
stay-aways on the other hand, were called for by the youthful and
inexperienced SSRC who, except for two days in September, were
essentially Soweto-based. They emerged after a relatively short
period of activism and never established links with organised labour.
Their political education had been drawn in large part from the
black consciousness movement in contrast with that of the Congress
movement and its more clearly formulated programme based on the
Freedom Charter of 1955. A further crucial difference lay in the
length of the stay-away; besides the 1958 stay-away, which failed,
and the 1961 stay-away, which was only partly successful; all the
stay-aways in the 1950's were one-day demonstration stoppages.
The stay-aways called by the SSRC, however, were not less than 3
days and sometimes, as in November, 5 days. This suggests that
the SSRC strategy went beyond a mere demonstration as with PAC in
1960. It seems to have had quasi-syndicaHent overtones.
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However, the differences are less significant than two crucial
similarities. The first similarity lies in the response of the
state and employers. Here the initial threat of mass action,
coupled with employer recommendations for reform in the conditions
of urban Africans, turned inevitably to hardening of attitudes,
coupled with harrassment and subsequent banning of the leaders
and their organisations. A memo distributed by the Transvaal
Chamber of Industries after the 1958 stay-away is remarkably similar
to that sent by the Chamber to the Prime Minister after the 1976
stay-aways. The 1958 memorandum draws attention to the "solid
political and economic reasons for dissatisfaction" among the black
population. Proposals by the Chamber include raising wages by
"permitting dilution of skilled labour", better and cheaper transport,
reduction in house-rents, and improved amenities in the townships
and improved methods of communication with workers. The 1976
memo from the Chamber of Industries advocates better transport,
improved township amenities, streaming of influx control, and money
for housing. In neither memo is the question of trade unions for
blacks tackled. Likewise the response of the state in banning the
ANC and PAC in 1960 and the banning of 17 black consciousness
organisations in 1977 follows a similar pattern.
The second crucial similarity lies with the organisational problems
raised by the tactic itself. The central problem with the tactic
lies in the fact that the maximum weapon of the stay-away against
the system, is a simple absence through the withdrawal of labour.
In essence, the worker surrenders all initiative to the employer.
This has two implications. Firstly, as we argued in our explanation
for the limited success of the 1961 stay-away, with all townships
sealed off by police and army road-blocks, with all newspapers
taking part in the "conspiracy of silence", the situation becomes
confused. The organisers cannot make adequate news available to
the workers because they have limited access to the media. However,
the more important implication is that stay-aways allow employers
to reduce labour costs on their terms. This can be best illustrated
by the employers1 threat to those who stayed-away of retrenchment
and dismissal during the 1976 stay-aways.
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In a letter sent by the Transvaal Chamber of Industries to its
members, the president recommended that employers "turn their
attention to labour saving devices to lessen their dependence on
their labour force. On an earlier occasion, after the second
stay-away, he said that employers were looking into their
dependence on African workers. "Most industrialists feel they are
too vulnerable and may pay renewed attention to lessening their
dependence by employing more Coloured or by increasing mechanisation.
Other industrialists have denied that the increased mechanisation
was a result of stay-aways. "Automation has nothing to do with
Soweto. We are following the overseas pattern and it would have to
come anyway" said Norman Gilbert, Chairman of machine Tool Merchants
Association. Of course Gilbert is right to stress the trend
towards mechanisation since the Second World War. The growth in
capital intensity for the economy as a whole has been growing at
7fi
the steady rate of 2.4 percent between 1946 and 1975. However,
the point is not that the stay-aways caused retrenchment and
mechanisation but that simply by staying away employers were able
to dismiss what they saw as redundant or uncooperative employees
in a recessionary climate. Clearly the danger of dismissal is
considerably greater in periods of high unemployment. Thus labour
costs were reduced without any specific resistance to this process
of intensifying labour exploitation. It is interesting to contrast
the lack of specific work-place objectives in the stay-aways with
factory-based resistance by the trade unions to retrenchment at
this time. In September and October 1976 workers at the Armourplate
factory in Springs went on strike in order to make management honour
an agreement to put employers on short-time rather than retrench
79three workers. Similarly the Metal and Allied Workers Union,
after a survey of retrenchment in a series of engineering firms on
80the Witwatersrand, made specific recommendations to management.
The second limitation in the stay-away is that it is an essentially
township-based tactic. Of course it is precisely the township-based
nature of the stay-away that has been its attraction - it is easy
to mobilise township residents, particularly when you don't have
organisation at the place of work. But it is unable to mobilise
those sectors where workers are housed in tightly-controlled
situations, isolated from townships, without alternative sources of
food or family support. Thus the key productive sector of mining
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was not affected by stay-aways, Similarly, in September 1976 the
South African Railways was not affected because most of the workers
live in compounds outside Soweto.
Finally, lacking co-ordinated organisation and the financial
resources for a long strike, workers cannot stay out indefinitely.
To do so is to starve. Even if food is stored in advance the
families cannot hold out for long because of the presence of
children, the sick and the aged. The townships can be easily sealed
off by the police - they have been built to specification to allow
Q -I
tight surveillance and control by small numbers of police.
Workers seem to have understood these limitations very well when,
instead of supporting the train boycot called for on February 1st
1973 in Durban, they decided to continue with their plant-based
action. Nearly a third of those who were asked why people did not
join the train boycot gave, as an explanation, either that workers
were more concerned with striking for wages or that they lacked
Q p
organisation. This decision highlights the crucial difference
between the stay-away on one hand and plant-based action on the
other. The crucial feature of plant-based action is that it focusses
around issues generated in the work-place. As table 4 indicates,
the pattern of strike activity was to change dramatically in 1973
when after a decade of low strike incidence, a wave of plant.based
strikes was to emerge reaching a peak in 1973. As a sustained form
of working-class action, independent of formal organisation, these
8 ?
strikes indicate a growing maturity of working class consciousness.
The strikes.were to achieve significant wage increases and led to
relatively few dismissals and prosecutions.
Table 4 84
Comparative lable regarding disputes and strikes:
Year
1973
1974
1975
1U/6
19/7
Disputes without
stoppage of work
No.
47
33
21
16
9
Employees
involved
3 846
4 126
2 790
1 087
426
No.
115
185
148
124
49
Disputes with
stoppage of work
Employees
involved
22 744
19 932
10 699
10 ^66
7 084
Man hours
lost
261 586
109 372
•14 514
45 437
69 135
No.
2-16
189
119
105
38
Strikes
impioyees
involved
67 338
37 724
11 847
1 5 725
7 866
Manhours
lost
1 389 873
653 243
101 688
130 675
50 761
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Although strike action was to decline in the years following, a
higher level of strike activity was sustained throughout the 1970's
than any other period since the Second World War, These strikes
followed the familiar pattern of employer-support from the
Department of Labour, followed by police action, management
intransigence and essentially work place demands such as higher
ft S
wages, union recognition, better conditions, etc.
Out of this renewed working class militancy, 5 different groupings
of worker organisations were to emerge in the 1970"s. By the 31st
of August 1975, the Institute of Race Relations listed 59,550
members of the Black trade union movement, roughly divided into 5
positions:-
1) the parallel unions affiliated to TUSCA
2) Black Allied Workers Union
3) the Urban Training Project unions
4) TUACC Trade Union Advisory Co-ordinated Council, and
5) the Western Province Workers Advice Bureau.
However, whereas in the 19 50 fs most African trade unions were
closely linked with the popular resistance in the townships, these
unions of the 1970's, with the exception of Black Allied Workers
Union, were to maintain a clear distance from the stay-aways of
1976. Formed in 1972 as the trade union wing of the Black
Consciousness movement, the Black Allied Workers Union has articulated
a strong political orientation and has limited shop floor organisation
Drake Koka, one of the leaders of Black Allied Workers Union, was
alleged in the SSRC trial to have arranged for the typing of
pamphlets during the stay-aways. Furthermore, Black Allied Workers
Union, in a memo submitted to the 6 3rd session of the International
Labour Organisation in Geneva, in June 1977, claimed to have
collaborated in the organisation of the stay-aways in 1976 "in
solidarity with their own children and country men, Black workers,
under the basis and aegis of Black Allied Workers Union and brother
unions, obeyed and collaborated in the call and launch of 4 stay-
away strikes (June to November) irrespective of the law that
ft 7
prohibits Black workers from striking".
While large numbers of clothing workers in the Transvaal and Western
Cape participated in the stay-aways, it was certainly not because
of support from their leadership. Many workers were often in
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phenomenon which at a certain moment follow with historical
necessity from the social relations". "The general strike, she
seen as an isolated
says, must not be/revolutionary rupture, but rather a sign-
subordinate and demonstrative-of wider revolutionary struggles to
come". To see it, as anarcho-syndicalists said as Bakunin did,
as a lever to introduce social revolution, is to misunderstand it.
The general strike demonstrates the power of the masses to withdraw
their labour and therefore the dependency of the system upon them.
But they remain demonstrations, not organised challenges.
Consequently the effectiveness of a stay-away is evaluated in terms
of the percentage of blacks who stayed away from work.
A successful stay-away, the organisers argue, is one where large
numbers of blacks stay-away from work: a failure is one where
very few stay-away. But this, of course, is to focus only on one
dimension of the stay-away - ultimately a successful stay-away is
one where the shock effect of the demonstration of power reverberates
through to the dominant classes in a way that forces them to realise
the necessity for reform. The Wage Board activity which followed
the 1957 stay-away is such an example. But to see it as an
alternative to organisation in the factory or to prolong the stay-
away is to misunderstand it as a strategic weapon. This is of
particular importance in a situation of recession and high
unemployment where the stay-away provides capital with an opportunity
and
to intensify exploitation/through state repression to demonstrate
the weakness of the working class.
The implications are now clear; the strike is fundamentally an
economic weapon, which easily boomerangs if used on terrain for
which it is not designed. Since the nature of the economy as a
system is ultimately a political question, it follows that strikes
have only a relative and not an absolute efficacy in the. economic
struggle; itself.92 However it -is primarily., though not exclusively
¥org^i^ers^a^1ind the establishment of intermediate
institutions in the work-place that black workeis . can__
acquire " the confidence and the organisation to take on the
broader political struggles.
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